by the argument that the existence of large firms in oligopolistic or cartelised industries was conducive to technological progress. 4 Rowley saw himself in a minority in arguing that the Commission had been too easily impressed by claims that cartels were good for innovation in cases such as insulin (1949) and electric lamps (1951) and pointed out that contentions that price-fixing agreements encourage R&D were commonplace.
Schumpeter had, of course, already discussed the issue of the relationship between market structure and technological change prior to the establishment of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission in 1948. 6 Schumpeter's famous argument was that the profits earned by large, monopolistic enterprise were the allies of innovation as 'the baits that lure capital on untried trails' and it seems clear that this hypothesis had considerable influence during the early postwar period, particularly through the work of Galbraith. 7 Greater heed should perhaps have been paid to Hicks who had already made his well-known remark that the 'best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life', although not specifically with regard to innovative activity. Today's growth economics sees market power as potentially good for innovation and growth because in Schumpeterian fashion it raises the appropriability of returns while recognising that in a world where shareholders have difficulty in monitoring managers, principal agent problems may be reflected in a lack of energy in pursuing cost reduction in a Hicksian fashion.
Thus, Aghion et al. formalise the argument and show that it can go either
way. 9 Their model shows that, when managers find cost-reducing effort sufficiently costly, product market competition can act as a disciplinary device fostering technology adoption and growth. If this 'conservative' type of firm predominates, then stronger competition policy is good while industrial policy that subsidises incumbent firms is bad for technological change whereas for profit-maximising firms free of agency costs the opposite is the case.
On the other hand, generally speaking, industrial economists have become rather sceptical of claims that ex ante market power conferred by 6 J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London, 1943). 7 Ibid., p.90; J.K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (London, 1957 ). Schumpeter' s claim has two components, namely, that innovative activity increases more than proportionately with firm size and that the prospect of appropriating monopoly rents means that market power encourages technological progress. In this paper we are concerned only with the latter proposition which we term the Schumpeterian hypothesis. Economy, Vol.104 (1996), pp.724-745. to raise productivity growth by 1 per cent per annum in firms without a dominant external shareholder but to have no effect where there was such an ownership interest.
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In the 1950's, market power in Britain was frequently exercised through collusive behaviour. As with other departures from competition, economic theory is ambivalent about the impact of collusion on R&D and innovation. A recent review of this literature did point out, however, that the presumption that cartels are welfare enhancing on Schumpeterian grounds is harder to accept because, unlike the case of a monopoly which restricts output, collusive agreements may well operate on the basis of equiproportionate cuts in output of all members with the least efficient plants remaining in production as members seek to ensure their survival if the cartel breaks down.
16
The ultimate objective of this paper is to investigate the Schumpeterian hypothesis that market power promotes technological change as applied to 1950's Britain. Was the support for this idea valid then but not later or did it represent an unfortunate policy error ? In order to answer this question, it is necessary in section II first to establish the incidence of cartels at the industry level. Section III then analyses the cross-sectional relationship between market structure and the volume of innovation as measured by the Science Policy Research Unit database while section IV places the results in the context of early postwar productivity performance and competition policy.
Conclusions are in section V.
II THE INCIDENCE OF PRICE-FIXING BASED ON AGREEMENTS

REGISTERED UNDER THE 1956 ACT
The 1956 Restrictive Practices Act required that all collusive agreements were registered. The presumption embodied in the Act was that agreements were against the 'public interest' but participants had the 15 S.J. Nickell, D. Nicolitsas and N. Dryden, ' What Makes Firms Perform Well?' , European Economic Review, Vol.41 (1997), pp.783-796. opportunity to defend their agreements in the Restrictive Practices Court to show that there were economic benefits that outweighed any possible loss from anti-competitive practices. Indeed, the 1956 Act itemised six so-called 'gateways' through which a public interest exemption could be obtained. The legislation also created a Registrar of Restrictive Practices whose function was to maintain a public register of agreements and take them to the Court unless they were minor or of no economic significance. The Registrar published Reports initially every two and then every three years.
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Although some agreements may have been abandoned straightaway or gone underground, it is generally agreed that registration was fairly complete since, initially, most industrialists were anticipating that there was a good chance that their agreements would be judged not to be against the public interest. Indeed, the window on collusion provided by the 1956 Act offers a unique opportunity to measure the extent of price-fixing. This is because before the Act, investigators had to rely on survey methods, which they fully accepted were unable to give a complete picture of price-fixing. 18 And once it became clear that many of the registered agreements would not be allowed to stand, collusive behaviour became tacit or concealed.
The agreements were subsequently made available for inspection under the auspices of the Registrar for Restrictive Trading Agreements. Elliott and Gribbin analysed their contents with a view to establishing both the extent of price-fixing collusion and also its sectoral incidence at SIC order level. reference at all to price-fixing or market-sharing among the brewers.
In seeking to establish which industries were most affected by collusive price-fixing, we identified only those agreements containing detailed price lists which applied nationally to manufactured products and assigned these to the appropriate 1968 Standard Industrial Classification MLH. 24 From this category, on the advice of officials in the Office of Fair Trading, notably David Elliott, one of the authors of the 1977 paper, a further subset were identified as serious cases, namely, those which were taken to the Restrictive Practices Court by the Registrar or where the abandonment of agreements was announced by the Registrar as freeing a sector from price-fixing. Thus, file no. 579 (assigned to MLH 369) is in this category whereas file no 2317 plainly is not.
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The agreements are available for public inspection at the Government Building, Bromyard Avenue, London W3 7BB. The files are in room 405B (Restrictive Trade Practices). 24 We did not include very broadly defined industries where only a very small proportion of output was covered by price-fixing agreements.
Industries which had no detailed price list agreements were classified as free of price-fixing cartels. In some cases, only national agreements without price lists were found but in virtually all these sectors these appear to have been quite limited in their impact. In general, a high incidence of agreements without price lists was found only in cases where there was also significant evidence of detailed list agreements. Sectors in which there were detailed price list agreements which were not serious enough for court action or mention of termination in the Registrar's reports were classified in an intermediate category as uncertain. This procedure found 37 three digit MLH industries in the Census of Production subject to serious price-fixing cartels.
These sectors are listed in Table 1 while Table 2 lists 47 sectors in which no agreements of any consequence were found. The remaining 148 sectors showed some evidence of price-fixing agreements but these are likely to have had less important economic effects than for the sectors listed in The Hicksian (direct) effect is captured through the coefficient α 3 , which is expected to be negative. The Schumpeterian (indirect) effect is captured through the term α 1 β 1 , which is expected to be positive. The sign of γ 1 is therefore ambiguous. : 1945 -1983 ' , Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol.35 (1987 P.E. Hart, and R. Clarke, Concentration in British Industry, 1935 -1975 (Cambridge, 1980) . listed in Table 2 , a value of 2 assigned to industries listed in Table 1 British Industry, 1954 -1986 (Cambridge, 1994 . workers were covered by local (not national) agreements captures the impact of collective bargaining. This variable is described in Broadberry and Crafts. 36 The fifth issue concerns the estimation method. Since the dependent variable INNOVATION cannot fall below zero, ordinary least squares will tend to bias coefficients towards zero. However, as Geroski notes, the Tobit estimator, the standard procedure to deal with this problem, is not always robust to minor mis-specifications, so that the choice between OLS and Tobit estimates is not necessarily straightforward.
: A Study of the Growth, Causes and Effects of Concentration in British Manufacturing Industries
37 Accordingly, we report estimates using both methods.
Before proceeding to the regression results, it may be useful to get a feel for the data. For illustration, (iii) and (iv) 
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In particular, CR5 and RESPRAC remain statistically insignificant if either is dropped or if an interaction term is included.
Predictions concerning the impact of the collective bargaining variable, LOCALAGT, might well vary. On the one hand, it may reflect situations where multiple unionism leads to reluctance to innovate by employers worried about ex post threats to profits from workers as in Bean and Crafts, while on the other hand it might be argued that bargaining at the local rather than the national level allows greater flexibility in the adjustment of working practices to facilitate innovation. 40 The latter effect seems to dominate here as LOCALAGT always has a positive sign and is statistically significant in equation ( and that the absence of competitive pressure prevented the exit of high cost plant while collective decision-making did not require the cost comparisons that would be made by an efficient monopolist. 44 The review of these early reports by Howard reaches a conclusion similar to the theoretical prediction of Baumol, namely, that rationalisation of production in cartels was precluded by fears of high-cost firms of the consequences in the event of cartel collapse.
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While we have found little evidence to support the Schumpeterian hypothesis that market power was associated with high levels of innovation, this does not imply strong support for the view that competitive markets were good for innovation. Rather, it suggests a balance between the Schumpeterian and Hicksian effects. Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the inference that, prior to the Restrictive Practices Act, competition policy was much too lenient. Price-fixing agreements were widespread but there is no evidence that, on average, the static welfare losses that this entailed were compensated by faster technological progress while there do seem to have been negative implications for productivity performance.
Put together with the results on productivity growth during the period 1954-63 presented in Broadberry and Crafts, the above results on innovation aid our understanding of the way that the climate of collusion in early postwar Britain affected industrial performance. 46 Our earlier paper showed that concentration and cartelisation lowered productivity growth, while the current paper shows that concentration and collusion did not have a significant adverse effect on innovation. This suggests that the problems of British industry at this time arose largely not from a failure to innovate per se, but rather from difficulties in converting those innovations into higher productivity.
This, in turn, offers further support for the emphasis on restrictive labour practices in our earlier paper. Economics, Vol.30 (1999), pp.475-497. conclusion matches that of later industrial economists. We conclude that there was nothing special about the 1950's and that the economists and policymakers of the day paid too little attention to the Hicksian view of monopoly. Since cartels had adverse effects on productivity performance and on consumers, the absence of any significant effect in promoting innovations suggests that the weakness of anti-trust policy in early postwar Britain was most unfortunate.
During the 1970s, continued state intervention on a large scale suggests that the agency costs issue was not well understood in government.
Policies of widespread industrial subsidy, nationalisation and encouragement of mergers would not have been pursued so vigorously had an analysis of their effects based on the "conservative firm" model informed the orthodox view. This raises two important questions for further research. First, is it possible to distinguish between "conservative" and profit-maximising firms in postwar Britain? And second, how and when did serious appreciation of the principal-agent problem take hold in Whitehall? 
